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STATE OF UTAH
of the
IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT

ED\YARD STEYEXS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

7781

FEARX GRAY,
Defendant and Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT
OF FACTS
At the beginning of respondent's brief, it is stated
that appellant's brief contains unnecessary repetition
and that counsel for respondent is unable to agree with
the statement contained in appellant's brief. There are
some repetitions in appellant's brief, but it will be noted
that respondent's brief, insofar as it accurately reflects
the evidence, is a mere repetition of what is said in
appellant's brief. We, of course, did not expect counsel
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for respondent to agree with the conclusions reached
by appellant, but nowhere in respondent's brief is it
pointed out wherein t~ere is any mis-statement of the
evidence which we have abstracted at some length in
our opening brief. On page 2 of respondent's brief, mention is made of the fact that on page 5 of appellant's
brief, we directed the attention. of the Court to errors
of the trial court that were favorable to the appellant.
We have always understood that the function of a Statement of the Case is to direct the attention of the court
to the facts without regard to which party is prejudiced
thereby.
On page 3 of respondent's brief, attention is called
to dashes after the word Dixon on page 81 of the transcript. Apparently something is claimed for the dashes.
However, there can be no misunderstanding of the fact
that the defendant on both his direct and cross-examination testified that he did not pay $1000.00 on the note
(Tr. 423-424). No amount of argument can change that
fact and we submit that no authority can be found that
an award should be sustained in favor of a party who,
on both direct and cross-examination, testifies under oath
that he is not entitled thereto. Nor does the plaintiff
on page 64, or at all in his reply to the amended counterclaim, recognize any such a credit, but on the contrary
on such page plaintiff alleges that defendant is chargeable with $1000.00 of advance payment by Cudahy Packing Co. Again on page 3 of respondent's brief it is said
that Exhibit U was admitted in evidence upon 1notion of
defendant's counsel. That is true, but it was only after
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plaintiff had produced such exhibit showing that the
overpayment had been made to respondent that any
such admission was forthcoming (Tr. 620). Moreover
the pleadings in which defendant admitted that he had
received the overpayment of $1000.00 was not made until
after the defendant was confronted with the telegram.
As pointed out in our original brief, page 2, the Amended
Counterclaim was not filed until after all of the evidence
had been concluded.
On page 4 of respondent's brief, it is said that when
counsel reached page 13 of his brief, he forgot what he
said on pages 1 and 2 of his brief. Counsel for respondent is in error in assuming that counsel for appellant
was forgetful in such particular. The fact is that in
the original counterclaim (R. 8 to 17) the defendant made
no claim for extra compensation for men and equipment
used to feed the steers that were fed by him. He sought
credit at the rate of 35 cents per head for feeding the
steers as is shown on page 14 of his Counterclaim. When
he testified, he repeatedly stated that it cost 35 cents per
day for feed for the steers fed by him (Tr. 246 and 427).
At no time in his testimony did the defendant say that
it cost 36lf2 cents per day for feed which was fed to the
steers. He did testify as to the amount of hay, grain,
corn, cottonseed meal and bran which the steers would
eat per day. It will be noted he did not testify that the
steers would eat the maximum amount he sought credit
for throughout the entire feeding period. If he had so
testified, his testimony would have been in direct conflict
with all of the other witnesses, including his own witness,
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Rodney Martin. Notwithstanding the defendant repeatedly stated that 35 cents per day was the cost of feeding
the steers. When the Amended Counterclaim was filed,
which was after all of the evidence was in, the cost of
the feed for the steers was boosted to 36¥2 cents per
day and the defendant was allowed all he asked for
men and equipment, which he claimed he used in caring
for the steers. The law is well settled that the testimony
of a witness is no stronger than its weakest part. The
record conclusively shows that defendant's memory was
enlarged after he learned that he must have additional
charges to escape a substantial judgment being rendered
against him in favor of the plaintiff.
REPLY TO POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT AS TO THE REASON ABLE
VALUE OF FEEDING CATTLE.

On page 9 of respondent's brief, it is said that counsel for the plaintiff presents a two-horned dilemma to
the court because he concedes that defendant be allowed
25 cents per day for feeding the steers that were fed
by him. There is a legal axiom applicable to situations
such as the one here presented that the law, in certain
kinds of evidence is intended as a shield, not a sword.
The fact that the plaintiff is willing to allow the defendant credit for the reasonable value of the feed which the
steers ate does not preclude him from insisting that
when the defendant seeks to recover almost twice what
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other cattle feeders fed their steers that he produce competent proof of such excessive claim.
It is also said on page 9 of defendant's brief that it
is a reasonable inference that Stevens know the basis
upon which Gray was feeding the cattle and that Stevens
may not, after ten years, insist that Gray should furnish
iten1ized accounts of the cost of the feed that the steers
ate. The evidence shows, without conflict, that Stevens
has, ever since the partnership ended, attempted, without
success, to secure fron1 the defendant an accounting (Tr.
32).
As we have pointed out in our original brief, partners are accountable to each other as a fiduciary. It is
so provided by U.C.A., 1943 69-1-18 and 19. There is
no valid reason why the obligation should be changed
because Gray may have raised some of the feed on the
ranch which he was leasing. He had a pair of scales on
the ranch where the cattle were being fed (Tr. 293 and
347). The barley that defendant fed to the steers was
rolled. According to defendant's testimony, it cost 15
cents per cwt. to get it rolled (Tr. 354). Of necessity,
if defendant raised any barley on the ranch which he fed
to the steers it must have been weighed. to ascertain the
cost of the rolling. No claim is made that the defendant
raised any corn cottonseed meal or bran on the farm.
He must, therefore, have purchased the same. He kept
a checking account and whenever it served his purposes,
he produced his checks. Independent of any law the most
elementary principles of fair dealing dictates that a
record should be kept involving the expenditures of
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many thousands of dollars. Not only did the plaintiff
have a right to rely upon the statutory law of this state,
but so far as we know everyone who engages in any kind
of business, especially since income taxes have been
exacted, keeps or should keep records of the expenses
of conducting his business.
On page 10 of respondent's brief, it is said that
there is no question about Gray's good faith. The record
does not bear out that statement. The least that one
can do who wishes to be fair is to keep a record of the
expenditures he has made when he seeks to be reimbursed
therefor. It is not the stamp of fair dealing to attempt
to secure nearly twice as much for f~eding steers and
providing men and equipment to feed the same as is
charged by others for furnishing the same or similar
feed and service. It is difficult to believe that the respondent did not know that he had received $1000.00
overpayment on the sale of partnership cattle until he
was confronted with the telegram "Exhibit U" which
showed that he had received the same. It is further said
that Gray, not Stevens, rendered his personal services
without compensation and that he it was who plowed
through the snow from Nephi to Sage Valley. Just what
is claimed by such a statement, even if true, we are unable
to comprehend. In light of the fact that Gray claims no
compensation and concedes he is entitled to none, no
useful purpose will be served by a discussion of the
relative amount of services rendered by the two partners.
Even if such matters were material, it is doubtful if Gray
would gain anything by an examination of that phase
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of the case, because so far as the evidence shows, Stevens
probably did as much actual work as did Gray, even if,
by some stretch of imagination, various automobile trips
that Gray and his wife took, and which respondent seeks
to charge to the partnership are to be regarded as proper
charges against the partnership (Tr. 261 and 267).
On page 11 of respondent's brief, it is said that it is
absurd to contend that respondent should keep a record
of what he expended for feed for the steers and at the
srune tiine Inake a charge of $5.00 per head for wintering
cattle. It is a matter of common knowledge that cattle
being fed for beef are placed in feed lots and the feed
hauled to them, and it is not only a simple matter but
many feeders for their own information, weigh the feed
that is eaten by the animals. Mr. Cowan kept records of
the amount he fed (Tr. 480). On the other hand cattle
that are wintered are usually permitted to run in an open
field. Such was the way the cattle that Mr. Dixon wintered were handled as were those in Sage Valley. It
would have been interesting if counsel, instead of using
such characterizing words as absurdity, if he had informed the court how one could determine the amount of forage that is consumed by an animal that is running in a
field. Would the one who is wintering cattle have someone follow the animals and make a record of the number
of blades of grass or other forage that each animal eats~
To ask the question is to answer it. To say that plaintiff
shows an absence of good faith because of the delay
and that he knew at all times that Gray kept no records
and that Stevens never requested information, is not
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only without support in the evidence, but is contrary
to the same. The evidence shows that Stevens attempted
to, but was unable to get any accounting from Gray (R.
32). So also is counsel in error when he says on page
12 of respondent's brief that plaintiff claimed or demanded no information that was denied him (R. 6 and
34).
On pages 13 to 23 a number of cases are cited to
the effect that defendant is entitled to the market value
of the hay, grain, bran and cottonseed meal that was
fed to the partnership steers even if some of the products
were produced on the farm which was leased by Gray.
We are at a loss to understand what bearing such cases
have upon this controversy. At no time during the trial
or at the argument at the conclusion of the evidence, or
in our opening brief have we contended, nor do we now
contend, that the fact that the defendant raised some of
the hay and possibly some of the grain that was fed to
the steers should deprive the defendant of the value of
the feed consumed by the steers. What we do contend
is that the defendant owed a duty, imposed by law, to
keep a record of the amount he actually paid for feed
and a record of the weight of the feed he may have raised
which was fed to the beef steers.
On pages 22 and 23 there is quoted certain evidence
of the defendant as to the cost of feeding steers at the
time of the trial and at some other time not specified
in commercial feed fed lots. It is, of course, a matter of
common knowledge that people who conduct a commercial
feed lot do so for the profit to be made. There is a vast
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difference between allowing Mr. Gray credit for the
an1ount he paid for the feed that was consumed by the
partnership steers or if he raised such feed the market
value thereof, and allowing him the amount that commercial feed lots are charging. If Gray is allowed credit
for the amount he paid for the feed consumed by the
steen; plus the market value of the products that he
may have raised on the land he was leasing, he is not
making a profit out of the partnership business. But,
on the other hand, if the defendant is paid more than
the actual cost of the feed together with the actual cost
of feeding it to the steers, he would be making a profit
out of the partnership business. Such, so far as we are
advised, is the doctrine announced by the authorities
generally including those cited by the respondent.
On the bottom of page 23 of respondent's brief,
attention is called to the fact that counsel for appellant
stated that he had no objection to defendant "showing
how many pounds of hay and grain and if he fixes the
amount and the value of the hay and grain, I think that
is the measure of damage." Counsel then says on the
next page that because of such statement assignment of
error numbered one is not made in good faith. For the
writer of this brief to say that counsel for respondent
is lacking in good faith when he says that assignment
numbered one was not made in good faith would not
enlighten the court or add any weight to our argument.
If the defendant had produced some checks or other
vouchers to show the amount that was fed to the steers
under his charge we would not have had any valid objec-
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tion to such evidence. He did not offer any such evidence.
On the contrary the most that can be said for defendant's
testimony is that he was permitted, over objection of
appellant's counsel, to express an opinion as to what he
or his hired men may have fed to the steers.
On page 25 of respondent's brief, it is said:
"The testimony of defendant is positive, and
is undisputed that he actually fed the quantities
set out. * * * No witness was ever called to contradict the defendant's testimony. * * * Mr.
Provstgaard was called as plaintiff's witness; if
anyone was in a position to contradict defendant's testimony as to the amount of grain, bran,
cottonseed meal and hay fed, it was the man who
· actually did the feeding. Plaintiff's counsel, however, refrained from asking the witness any question with respect to that 1natter. Defendant'~
testimony remains uncontradicted."
The statements just quoted from respondent's brief
shows the vice of admitting in evidence the testimony of
the defendant as to the credit he should be allowed for
feeding partnership steers.

If, as counsel says, Mr.

Provstgaard fed the steers and only he knows what they
ate, then any testimony that may have been given by the
defendant on that subject matter would, of necessity, be
hearsay and hence incompetent. If the law should be that
the hearsay testimony of the defendant, that he caused
to be fed to the partnership steers the quantity of feed
that he testified to without any record to support the
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san1e, n1u~t be believed, then indeed the law touching
~uch 1uatters 1nust be radically revised.
The authorities teach the requireinent that a partner
account to his copartner must be such as to afford an
opportunity to the copartner to test the fact or the propriety of the expenditures and give the court the basis
for detenuining fr01n the facts of the transaction whether
the copartner has faithfully performed his duty. See
authorities cited on page 29 of appellant's original brief.
So far as is n1ade to appear neither :Mr. Gray nor ~Ir.
Provstgaard knew or could have known the mnount of
feed that was fed to the partnership steers. Obviously
~Ir. Gray, not having fed the steers and having failed
to present any checks or other records to show the
amount consumed, could not from memory recall such
facts. So also is there a total absence of evidence from
which it could be inferred that Provstgaard knew the
amount of feed that the steers fed by defendant Gray
consumed.
A reading of the testimony of the respondent Gray
makes it clear that the most favorable view that can be
taken of his testimony is that he expressed his opinion
as to the amount of feed consumed by the steers fed by
him. There are, of course, cases where expert testimony
must be resorted to as a matter of necessity. Indeed
one of the requisites for the admission of opinion evidence is necessity. 32 C.J.S., page 73, Sec. 445 and cases
cited in foot notes. In this case if the necessity existed
for the admission of the opinion evidence of the respondent, such necessity was brought about by his failure to
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perform his duty to keep books or other reliable records.
_Moreover if the argument made on behalf of respondent
to the effect that respondent's testimony as to the amount
eaten by the steers must be believed because not contradicted, then by the same token his testimony must have
been believed if he had testified that the steers consumed
hay and grain of the value of 75 cents or more per day.
One of the reasons for the requirement that the testimony
of a partner must be supported with proper records is
that otherwise the door is thrown wide open for the
perpetration of fraud.

REPLY TO POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR THE ITEMS MENTIONED
IN POINT FOUR OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF.

Much of what is said under respondent's point two
has been replied to under point one hereof, and we shall
not repeat what is there said except to again observe
that Gray did not do the feeding and hence could not
know what was fed except by hearsay; that .if he kept
a record he did not produce the same or explain why the
same was not produced; that while it appears respondent
kept a checking account and he produced cancelled checks
when it served his purpose, he did not produce any cancelled checks for feed that he bought or offer any testimony why cancelled checks for feed were not produced.
It should further be noted that on pages 28 and 29
of appellant's brief we pointed out an error in computa-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
tion in the su1n of $760.00 in favor of the respondent and
for which he "·a~ erroneou~ly given credit. No claim is or
can be ~urre~sfully made that the trial court properly
allowed respondent credit for that amount.
On page :2G of respondent's brief, it is again apparently urged that respondent's testimony should be taken
at it~ face value. It is further stated that cattle may be
maintained without losing weight on much smaller feeding than when being fed for beef. This later observation
can haYe no bearing upon this controversy. All of the
witnesses called by the plaintiff testified as to the feed
consumed by cattle being fed for beef. It is true that
the "·itnesses produced by the plaintiff had not fed
exactly the same number or exactly the same kind of feed
that respondent claims to have fed. If such fact is of
controlling importance, then indeed can a partner, by
failing to perform his duty of keeping proper records
write his own ticket and charge his copartner whatever
he sees fit by saying as is attempted here, "I did or
caused the feeding to be done and you don't know what
I did or caused to be done and therefore you must take
my word for it." The purport of such argument is that
one partner may bind his copartner as to the cost of
feeding partnership steers by failing to perform his duty
of keeping records unless someone can be found to testify to having fed an equal number of steers, with the
same appetite, of the same weight, identically the same
kind of feed for the same length of time and under the
same climatic conditions, etc. If that is the law then a
copartner instead of being under the obligation of a
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fiduciary as the law provides would be at liberty to fleece
his partner with impunity.
The purpose of feeding steers for beef is, of course,
to give them all they will eat in order to get them fat.
It is a matter of common knowledge that steers being
prepared for market are not fed merely enough to keep
them alive. On pages 29 and 30 of respondent's brief
illustrations are given of what David Schuler may or
may not have done under his contract to feed some of
the partnership steers for 30 cents per day, which included the equipment necessary to haul the feed. So far
as appears the manner in which Mr. Schuler fed the
steers was entirely satisfactory to the respondent.
On page 33 of respondent's brief, it is said that the
steers fed by Gray made an increase of 200 pounds over
a period of 141 days. Here again there is total failure
of any record or other evidence to support such claim.
He produced nothing to show the weight of the steers
either when they were put in or taken out of the feed
lots. There is nothing which shows that Gray gave the
steers that were fed under his direction any better care
than was given to the steers testified to by the other witnesses.
On pages 32, 33 and 34 of respondent's brief, the
testimony of Howard Stevens is discussed, and attention
is called to Exhibit F, which seems to have been the
Bill of Sale for the cattle fed by Howard Stevens. We
are at a loss to see where respondent can derive any
c01nfort from such testimony. Howard Stevens made
an estimate that the steers weighed around 950 pounds
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when they were put in the feed yards and were fed 130
days {Tr. 33~). He. further testified that the steers
weighed about 1140 pounds per head when they went
out (Tr. 553). Later on cross-exan1ination, he stated that
he belieYed the steers weighed 1100 pounds when they
were sold (Tr. 37(i). It will be noted that Howard Stevens
merely gave his judgment as to what the cattle weighed
when they were put on feed and when they had been
fed for 130 days. It may be that he was in error as to
his judgn1ent of weights, but that does not show that
they were not properly fed.
The other matters discussed under Point Three of
respondent's brief are covered by our original brief and
we shall not add to what is there said.
REPLY TO POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
PLAINTIFF CREDIT FOR WINTERING FORTY-THREE
HEAD OF CATTLE IN 1937-1938.

Fnder point three of respondent's brief, it is argued
that the cattle plaintiff claimed were wintered by him
were not Grantsville cattle and the year is wrong and.
therefore the trial court properly denied plaintiff credit
for feeding cattle even though the plaintiff did feed
the number of head and for the price claimed by him.
Even if we were to concede respondent is right as to
the particular cattle wintered and the year when wintered, which we do not concede, it has always been the
law in this jurisdiction so far as we are advised that
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such an immaterial variance does not effect the right
of recovery. U.C.A. 1943 104-14-1 and cases cited in
footnote.
REPLY TO POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN MAKING ITS
FINDING No. 5 AND IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT CREDIT
FOR THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN POINT THREE OF
PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS.

The vice of allowing credit to a partner for items
for which no voucher is presented and then allowing
credit for other items of the same kind where vouchers
are presented is made evident by the various items for
hay discussed under Point Four of respondent's brief.
Thus the respondent sought and was awarded credit
for hay fed and to the partnership steers that were being
fed for beef without any vouchers or other evidence,
except his expressed opinion and then he produces a
number of checks which he claims were paid for hay fed
to other partnership cattle. There is no way that appellant can ascertain whether the hay for which credit is
claimed was hay fed to the steers that were being fed
for beef or to other cattle. In other words, the appellant
is at the absolute mercy of the respondent under such
circumstances. There is the additional circumstance
which casts grave doubt on those claims as pointed out
in our original brief, namely, it is claimed that the questioned checks were given for hay fed to partnership
cattle that were brought in from Mosida and Sage Valley.
The McClellan checks are dated April 7, 1937 while the
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evidence shows that the partnership cattle to which it is
claimed the hay was fed were in l\losida and Sage Valley at the tiine of the alleged purchase and were not
brought to the ranch leased by Gray until the following
:Jiay. 'Ye haYe nothing further to add by way of reply
to Point Four of respondent's brief beyond what is said
in our original brief.
REPLY TO POINT FIYE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED FROM HIS OWN USE
THE SUM OF $77,145.49 FROM THE SALE OF PARTNERSHIP CATTLE.

'Ve have discussed this matter at some length in
our original brief and little need be added to what is
there said. Were it not for the fact that Mr. Gray (in
the face of the pleadings and what it was stipulated ~T r.
Dixon would testify to), testified that he did not pay
$1000.00 on the note, there would be merit to the claim
that he was entitled to a credit of the $1000.00. It will
be noted that by his amended counterclaim, respondent
charges himself with the sum of $77,145.49 (R. 41).
Thus both respondent's pleading and evidence shows
that he should be charged with the $1000.00. In order to
reconcile such pleading and the evidence of the respondent with the stipulation referred to in respondent's brief
on pages 43 to 46 is that the $1000.00 paid on the partnership note was partnership money received from the sale
of partnership cattle not otherwise accounted for. If
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plaintiff paid the $1000.00 from his own funds, it is to
say the least extremely unlikely that he would be so
positive that he did not pay the same.

REPLY TO POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED FROM HIS OWN USE THE
MONEY MENTIONED UNDER APPELLANT'S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER SIX.

In our original brief, we have discussed this point
at some length and do not wish to enlarge on what is
there said. We do wish to correct the impression left
by respondent's brief when he says that there was substantial and competent evidence to justify the court in
making its finding upon that matter. The fact of the
matter is the trial court made no finding one way or the
other on that issue. It will be observed that on page 2 of
respondent's brief, it is said that the case and the decision apparently resulted in much more confusion of the
matter to counsel than to the trial court. From the argument made to the phantom finding as to the issues discussed under point six of respondent's brief, it is quite
apparent that it was respondent's counsel who is referred to as being much more confused than the trial court.

REPLY TO POINT SEVEN
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING TO
CHARGE DEFENDANT WITH AT LEAST THIRTY-ONE
HEAD OF PARTNERSHIP CATTLE FOR WHICH HE DID
NOT ACCOUNT.
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On page 46 of respondent's brief, it is stated that
in one place in appellant's brief he claims that 31 and
in another place 35 head of cattle were not accounted for
by defendant. Counsel is in error in making such statement. \Yhat we do state is the fact that there were 35
head of cattle more purchased than are accounted for
as having been sold and that not more than four head
are accounted for as having been lost or having died.
It is true that we clain1ed, and we submit that the evidence without conflict shows that 1\fr. Gray, according
to his own evidence, bought and sold a number of cattle
without the knowledge of ~Ir. Stevens. That matter is
discussed and the place in the transcript where the evidence can be found is referred to on page 9 and 10 of
appellant's original brief.
Counsel for respondent is clearly in error in the
statement made on page 50 of his brief that it is undisputed that the plaintiff received the money for the sale
of seven head of cattle that were sold at Delta. We have
discussed that phase of the case at considerable length
under Point Six, pages 52 to 55 of our original brief.
We have there pointed out the various conflicting statements of respondent (Tr. pages 297 to 300, 305 to 307,
and 312 to 316), and to the testimony of the appellant
(Tr. 536-7) where he positively stated that he did not
receive the money and that he kept a bank account in
which he deposited his receipts, but no deposit of any
such amount was made by him. On the other hand, Mr.
Gray deposited to his account $986.00 on July 10, 1937,
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but he did not say where he received the money. He did
say it was not for the sale of cattle (Tr. 328).
On pages 51 to 53 of respondent's brief reference
is made to some bits of evidence and an attempt is made
to draw the conclusion that respondent is chargeable
with only 1370 cattle. The evidence upon which reliance
is based at most is a mere estimate. Thus, notwithstanding, he said that he did not feed any of his own cattle
after he began feeding partnership cattle (Tr. 253).
Later he said he had around 300 head of his own in the
feed yard with 17 or 18 head of partnership cattle. So
also is the evidence uncertain as to the number of cattle
that Mr. Shelly Dixon wintered (Tr. 165). Indeed all or
substantially all of the difficulty which confronts us in
this case is brought about by the failure of the respondent
to perform his duty to keep a record of his transactions
for and on behalf of the partnership. If respondent
wishes an answer to his question as to what became of
41 head of cattle he can find the answer in the testimony
of his own witness (Tr. 134 to 136).
It is very significant that at no time prior to the
submission of this case is there any evidence or pleading
which even remotely intimates that the plaintiff ever had
in his possession or that he disposed of any partnership
cattle that were not accounted for. It was not until the
amended counterclaim was filed that respondent made
any such suggestion, which as we have pointed out in
our original brief was not until Sept. 25, 1947 (see stamp
of Clerk on the back of R. 75). The trial was concluded
on July 23, 1947. In light of the time that elapsed between

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
the time of the trial of this case which began on June 17,
19-!7 and the tin1e it concluded on July 23, 1947 it is, to
say the least, difficult to believe that it did not occur to
the respondent that the plaintiff had failed to account
for smne of the partnership cattle if such were the fact.
On the other hand it is quite obvious that when the evidence was all in, the respondent discovered that there
were at least 31 head of cattle unaccounted for and that
he was chargeable with such cattle the same as the other
that he stated he did not have the slightest idea as to
when or where or to whom they were sold, notwithstanding he had their weights ( Tr. 297 et seq.).
REPLY TO POINT EIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT'S F AlLURE TO ALLOW DEFENDANT $1000.00 FOR THE USE OF DEFENDANT'S PERSONAL
AUTOMOBILE IN TRANSACTING PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS.

We have already directed the attention of the court
to the evidence touching the use of the automobile. It
is obvious that the court among its numerous other
errors and oversights failed to dispose of the issue as
to the use of the automobile.
REPLY TO POINT NINE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT $1,701.23 OR ANY OTHER AMOUNT
OF INTEREST.

As we have pointed out in our original brief, that it
would be a waste of time to argue the matter of interest
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at this time. There are numerous errors in respondent's
computation of interest, but until the nurnerous disputed
items are determined, it would be a total loss of time
and money to attempt to compute interest, and we are
therefore refraining from doing so.
REPLY TO POINT TEN
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT ANY CREDIT FOR OR CHARGE THE
PLAINTIFF WITH ANY MINERSVILLE CATTLE.

We have already directed the attention of the court
to the facts connected with his claim under Point Seven
and to the fact that there is not a scintilla of evidence
to support such claim. Also that no such claim was ever
asserted until after the case was tried and submitted and
then only as an amended counterclaim. Moreover the
defendant Gray testified at some length as to what
became of the Minersville cattle. He stated that on Dec.
1, 1936 he went with Mr. Stevens in Mr. Gray's car to
Minersville and purchased cattle there and at Milford;
that these cattle so purchased were shipped to Payson
and taken to his, defendant's ranch (Tr. 134). Of the
cattle purchased 31 were purchased at Minersville (Tr.
31). Thus not only is there no evidence that the plaintiff
received and failed to account for the Minersville cattle,
but defendant says he received the same at his ranch.
It will be further noted that in his amended counterclaim,
defendant states that in 1937-38 Stevens wintered 43
head and Gray 34 head of cattle at $5.00 per head (R.
14-47). It will be noted that cattle fed by Gray grew
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from 3-! to -t I between the tin1e of filing the original
and the mnended counterclaiin (R. 1-t and -t7). It Inay
be that one or both of these date8 is wrong, but if so
that cannot effect the results except possibly as to a
~mall amount of interest.

CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the judgment appealed from
should be reversed and the appellant granted the relief
prayed for in his original brief.

Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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